Chinese Cultural Studies:
Slightly abridged from: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. James Clavell, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 9-20, repr. In Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History, Volume I, (New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1995), pp. 84-88
A much fuller version, with very useful introductions and discussions, along with commentaries from other ancient Chinese writers, is available in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans Samuel B, Griffin, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963; later pb editions available), pb. another translation, by Lionel Giles, was available on the Internet.
[Kishlansky introduction] Although almost nothing is known of the life of Sun-tzu, his tract, The Art of War, has been one of the most influential military handbooks in world history. Legend has it that he served the Wu dynasty after being challenged by the emperor to make an effective army out of his concubines. Sun-tzu placed the emperor's two favorites at the head of two different files of concubines and when they failed to discipline their charges he cut their heads off despite the protests of the emperor. After that the concubines drilled effectively. He became known as Sun the warrior and is reputed never top have lost a battle.
The Art of War is noted for its realistic assessment of the political constraints of warfare. It is part drill book, part tactical survey, and part political treatise. Its advice has been followed for centuries and it continues to be consulted by modern Chinese leaders. In recent years it has been promoted as a tool in business schools in Japan and the United States.
THE TEXT of the ART OF WAR
The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter df life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances can it be neglected.
The art of war is governed by five constant factors, all of which need to be taken into account. They are: the Moral Law; Heaven; Earth; the Commander; Method and discipline,
The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
Heaven signifies night and day, coid and heat, times and seasons.
Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security: open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, tkte gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five factors should be familiar to every general. He who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, when seeking to determine your military conditions, make ybur decisions on the basis of a comparison in this wise:
Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law?
Which of the two generals has the most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?!
Which army is the stronger?
On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
In which army is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?
By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.... But remember: While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules and modify your plans accordingly.
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our' forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy helieve we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak. that he may grow arrogant.
lf he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
ON WAGING WAR
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, there sources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When your weapons are dulled, your ardor dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. In all history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme. importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
The skillful general does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply wagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. The value of time-that is, being a little ahead of your opponent-has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate. the man on whom it depends whether the nation shal~ be in peace or in peril.
THE SHEATHED SWORD
To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence con sists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment, or a company entire than to destroy them.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field, and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled ci~ies. because preparation of mantlets, movable shelters and various implements of war will take up three whole months and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph is complete.
This is the method of attacking by stratagem of using the sheathed sword.
It is the rule in war: If our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack. he may be crushed from behind; if to the reaward attack, he may be crushed in front.
If equally matched. we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
The general is the bulwark of the state: if the hulwark is strong at all points, the state will be strong.
There are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:
By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions that obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers' minds. Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a s tate, but not an army; opportunism and flexability, on the other hand, are militray rather than civic virtues.
He will win who knows when to fight and hen not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result ofa hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the
enemy is provided by the enemy himself. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth: he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost helghts of heaven. Thus, on the one hand. we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other to gain a victory that is complete
To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Nor is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole empire says, "Well done!" True excellence is to plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood......
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. But his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. For inasmuch as they are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he therefore wins no reputation for wisdom; and inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position that makes defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterward looks for victory. A victorious army opposed to a routed one is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
The consummate leader cultivates the Moral Law and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
1. What is Sun-tzu's attitude to war?
2. What does Sun-tzu see as the highest form of victory in a war? What does he think it takes in order to achieve victory?
3. The Art of War has be used to illustrate the creativity of Chou thought. Why?
4. What does the Art of War tell us about the society for which it was written? What were its values and view of human nature?